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Abstract
This paper introduces a subjective logic based argumentation framework primarily targeted at evidential reasoning. The frame-
work explicitly caters for argument schemes, accrual of arguments, and burden of proof; these concepts appear in many types
of argument, and are particularly useful in dialogues revolving around evidential reasoning. The concept of a sensor is also use-
ful in this domain, representing a source of evidence, and is incorporated in our framework. We show how the framework copes
with a number of problems that existing frameworks have difficulty dealing with, and how it can be situated within a simple dia-
logue game. Finally, we examine reasoning machinery that enables an agent to decide what argument to advance with the goal of
maximising its utility at the end of a dialogue.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
It has long been recognised that argumentation research can be divided into two main strands [16]. The first involves
the analysis of argument, while the second borrows ideas from argumentation theory in an attempt to create powerful
reasoning mechanisms. In this paper, we follow the latter strand, using argument to create a powerful framework
for evidential and diagnostic reasoning. Informally, we are trying to address situations where different agents, each
with their own goals and viewpoints, are attempting to reach a shared agreement about the state of a subset of their
environment. We further assume that the environment is partially observable, and that any information about it is
obtained through the use of fallible sensors. Finally, we assume that the agents are self interested, and that different
agents may have opposing goals.
Without a trusted third party, a centralised solution to this problem is difficult. Our proposed approach involves the
agents engaging in dialogue with each other, exchanging arguments, and probing sensors for additional information
about the environment. By combining the information from sensors and arguments, a shared world view can be
constructed. To tackle the problem, the following is needed:
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which interaction is required.
• A technique for determining which conclusions are justified when opposing arguments interact.
• A specification detailing how agents should engage in dialogue with each other.
• A way for the agents to decide which arguments to advance and what sensors to probe.
Prakken [15] identified these as the logical, dialectic, procedural and heuristic layers of an argument framework.
Our logical layer is built around subjective logic [6], allowing us to represent concepts such as likelihood and uncer-
tainty in a concise and elegant manner. The way in which arguments are constructed in our framework and used at
the dialectic level is intended to support a rich representation of arguments; we are able to represent concepts such
as accrual of arguments, argument schemes and argument reinforcement in a natural manner. While the logical and
dialectic layers are domain independent, acting as a general argument framework, the explicit introduction of sensors
at the procedural level allows us to attack our problem.
A sensor refers to anything that can determine the state of a subset of the environment. Multiple sensors may exist
for certain parts of the environment, and some of these sensors may be more accurate than others. Finally, sensors
may not perform their services for free. Thus, sensors capture an abstract notion of a source of evidence within our
framework.
At the procedural level, agents engaging in dialogue take turns to advance arguments and probe sensors in an
attempt to achieve their goals. In this context, an agent’s goal involves showing that a certain environment state holds.
We assume that an agent associates a utility with various goal states. Our heuristic layer guides an agent and tells it
what arguments to advance, and which sensors to probe during its turn in the dialogue game.
Using argumentation for evidential reasoning has a number of advantages over other approaches, including:
• Understandability. It is much easier to follow the reasoning behind a dialogue than to attempt to interpret a
complicated formula.
• Resource bounded reasoning. It is possible to plug in different agents with different capabilities (and hence dif-
ferent computational costs) and still obtain some (possibly non-accurate) answers.
• Anytime. Related to the previous point, it is possible to terminate the dialogue at any time, with the provision that
inaccurate, or incorrect answers may be obtained.
• Ease of knowledge engineering. At any point in the argument process, it is easy to introduce additional facts and
see how they alter the dialogue.
In this section, we provided a brief overview of the problem we are trying to tackle, and outlined our proposed
solution. Next, we discuss Subjective Logic, as it forms a core part of our formalism. Once this is done, we proceed
to describe our formalism, following which an illustrative example is provided. We then examine the strengths and
weaknesses of our approach in more detail, and compare it with existing techniques. We also examine possible areas
for future work before concluding the paper.
2. Subjective logic
Subjective logic [6] provides a standard set of logical operators (such as negation, conjunction and disjunction),
intended for use in domains containing uncertainty, and, more specifically, domains in which opinions regarding
the truth or falsehood of a (set of) domain elements differ. Subjective logic also contains a number of other operators,
designed to combine opinions in an intuitively correct manner. The semantics of our formalism, presented in Section 3,
are based on Subjective Logic (hereafter abbreviated SL), and we therefore now provide a brief overview of the area.
Most of this description is taken directly from Jøsang’s original paper [6].
Since SL is based on Dempster–Shafer evidence theory, it operates on a frame of discernment, denoted by Θ .
A frame of discernment contains the set of possible system states, only one of which represents the actual system
state. These are referred to as atomic system states.
In many situations, it is difficult to determine what state one is in, and it thus makes sense to talk about non-atomic
states, consisting of the union of a number of primitive states. If the system is in primitive atomic state xi , it is also in
all states xj such that xi ⊆ xj . The power set of Θ , denoted by 2Θ , consists of all possible unions of primitive states.
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sub-states) is true:
Definition 1 (Belief mass assignment). Given a frame of discernment Θ , one can associate a belief mass assignment1
mΘ(x) with each sub-state x ∈ 2Θ such that
(1) mΘ(x) 0;
(2) mΘ(∅) = 0;
(3) ∑x∈2Θ mΘ(x) = 1.
For a sub-state x, mΘ(x) is its belief mass.
Belief mass is an unwieldy concept to work with. When one speaks of belief regarding a certain state, one refers
not only to the belief mass in the state, but also to the belief masses of the state’s sub-states. Similarly, when one
speaks about disbelief, that is, the total belief that a state is not true, one needs to take sub-states into account. Finally,
subjective logic introduces the concept of uncertainty, that is, the amount of belief that one might be in a superstate or
a partially overlapping state. We can define these concepts formally as:
Definition 2 (Belief, disbelief and uncertainty). Given a frame of discernment Θ and a belief mass assignment mΘ on
Θ , we can define the belief function for a state x as
b(x) =
∑
y⊆x
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
The disbelief function as
d(x) =
∑
y∩x=∅
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
And the uncertainty function as
u(x) =
∑
y∩x =∅
yx
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
These functions have a number of features that should be noted. First, they all range between zero and one. Second,
they always sum to one, meaning that it is possible to deduce the value of one function given the other two. If the
entire belief mass is assigned to Θ , then u(x) = 1 if x = Θ . This situation is analogous to total uncertainty. Dogmatic
beliefs occur when no belief mass is assigned to Θ .
Another concept introduced in subjective logic is relative atomicity. The relative atomicity of two states x and y is
the ratio of the number of states shared between them and the number of states in y. Relative atomicity is needed to
compute the expected probability of an outcome, and captures the idea of prior probabilities. By taking into account
the provision that we cannot translate directly from opinions to probabilities, however, we ignore atomicity in the
interests of simplifying our framework.
A focused frame of discernment for a state x is a frame of discernment containing only the states x and x¯, the
complement of x. Jøsang provides a transformation from a frame of discernment to a focused frame. For a state x,
however, the only value that changes between the two frames is its atomicity.
An opinion consists of the belief, disbelief, uncertainty (and relative atomicity) as computed over a binary frame
of discernment:
1 A belief mass assignment is often also referred to as a basic belief assignment, or bba, within belief theory. Since our framework is Subjective
Logic based, we will refer to belief mass assignment within this paper.
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a belief mass assignment mΘ with belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative atomicity functions on x in Θ of b(x),
d(x), u(x) and a(x), we define an opinion over x, written ωx as
wx ≡
〈
b(x), d(x), u(x), a(x)
〉
Since we ignore atomicity, we write an opinion for a state x as the triple 〈b(x), d(x), u(x)〉. When the context
is clear, we may refer to (for example) the belief component of an opinion ωx as b(ωx). For compactness, we may
occasionally write bx, dx, ux instead of b(x), d(x) and u(x).
Jøsang has defined a large number of operators that are used to combine opinions, some of which are familiar such
as conjunction and disjunction, and some less so such as abduction. We look at three operators, namely negation,
discounting, and consensus.
The propositional negation operator calculates the opinion that a proposition does not hold, and is defined as
follows:
Definition 4 (Propositional negation). For a ωx = 〈bx, dx, ux〉, the propositional negation is computed as ω¬x =
〈dx, bx, ux〉.
Given an agent α, we represent its opinion on a proposition x as ωαx . Discounting is a model of hearsay; that is,
given that an agent α holds an opinion ωαβ about agent β’s reliability, and given that β has an opinion ω
β
x about
proposition x, ωαβx gives the opinion α has about x.
Definition 5 (Discounting). Given two opinions ωαβ = 〈bαβ, dαβ ,uαβ〉, and ωβx = 〈bβx , dβx , uβx 〉, the discounted opinion is
ω
αβ
x = 〈bαβbβx , bαβdβx , dαβ + uαβ + bαβuβx 〉.
The independent consensus operator represents the opinion an imaginary agent would have about x if it had to
assign equal weighting to the opinions ωαx and ω
β
x . Later work [7] suggests how one can handle situations where
κ = 0, but, by assuming that sensors reflect reality, we can ensure that κ is never 0 in our framework.
Definition 6 (Independent consensus). Given two independent opinions ωαx and ωβx about the same proposition x,
the independent consensus opinion is defined as ωα,βx = 〈(bαx uβx + bβx uαx )/κ, (dαx uβx + dβx uαx )/κ,uαxuβx /κ〉 where κ =
uαx + uβx − uαxuβx such that κ = 0.
To simplify notation, we may represent the operators as follows:
ω¬x ≡ ¬ωx
ωαβx ≡ ωαβ ⊗ωβx
ωα,βx ≡ ωαx ⊕ωβx
With this grounding, we are now in a position to describe our framework.
3. The framework
Following Prakken’s model [15], we build our framework in layers, starting at the logical layer, where we describe
how an argument is constructed. In the dialectic layer, we look at how arguments interact, and then show how agents
may engage in dialogue in the procedural layer. Finally, in the heuristic layer, we show how agents can decide which
lines of argument should be advanced in a dialogue.
One concept that cuts across a number of layers is that of an argument scheme [20]. Argument schemes are com-
mon, stereotypical patterns of reasoning which are, typically, non-deductive and nonmonotonic. In our framework,
arguments are instantiated instances of argument schemes. Thus, our universe of discourse is a tuple U = (PF,AS)
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geologist, and f for fred. Capitalised letters show non-atomic states.
where PF contains (a finite number of) possible facts about our universe, and AS is the set of argument schemes. We
also assume that we have two distinct sets of symbols Σ and Φ .
Facts are represented as grounded predicates, and have an associated opinion. A set of predicates with an identical
name acts as a frame of discernment. Since only a single state within a frame of discernment can be true, we cannot
simply match individual predicates to states. Instead, we define the atomic states by computing the power set of the
individual predicates, and associate a non-atomic state with the predicate that encapsulates all atomic states in which
the predicate holds. The left hand side of Fig. 1 provides an example of this.
Definition 7 (Predicate). Given a universe of discourse U = (PF,AS), a predicate is a tuple (Name,Parameters) ∈ PF
where Name ∈ Σ . Parameters is itself a tuple of finite arity whose members are elements of PF. Given two predicates
(N1,Parameters1), and (N2,Parameters2), |Parameters1| = |Parameters2| if N1 = N2.
We refer to the frame of discernment 2P , where P is the set of parameters defined as {Parameters|(Name,
Parameters) ∈ PF and Name = N}, as ΘN . This frame of discernment has additional states pi ∈ P containing all
states s ∈ 2P such that pi ⊆ s.
The atomic states of a frame of discernment ΘN are referred to as atomic(ΘN). We differentiate between atomic
and non-atomic states by writing the latter in bold.
A predicate is thus embedded within a frame of discernment, which in itself is another predicate. We assume the
existence of an anonymous, top level frame of discernment in which predicates reside. While it is possible to remove
this nesting, and store all predicates within a single universal frame of discernment, embedding them in this way helps
reduce the exponential explosion in the number of atomic states.
We place one restriction on the nesting of frames of discernment, and that is that the graph of nestings must be
acyclic, that is, a predicate may not nest other predicates such that it eventually nests itself.
As an example, consider the symbols a, b, fred,holds,geologist, expert and geology. We may have the following
predicates:
(holds, {a}), (holds, {b}), (holds, {geologist})
(geologist, {fred}), (expert, {(geologist,geology)})
For convenience, we rewrite a predicate of the form (A,B) as A(B). Thus, some of our possible facts include
holds(a), expert(geologist,geology), as well as holds(geologist) and holds(geologist(fred)). Note that atomic(Θholds)
is {a, b,geologist}.
Let us examine a subset of the holds frame of discernment, containing the predicates geologist (which in turn
contains the predicate fred) and a. Fig. 1 shows these frames of discernment, together with a belief mass assignment
to the various states.
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One question that we must answer is how nested belief masses (and from them opinions) are computed. For
example, what would the belief mass of holds(geologist(fred)) be? To answer this question, we need to merge our
frames of discernment. Fig. 2 shows the merged frame of discernment.
To create a merged frame of discernment from the frame of discernment of two predicates Θpr1,Θpr2 where
pr1 = (n1, {p11, . . . , p1m}), pr2 = p1i for some 1 < i < m, and pr2 = (n2, {p21, . . . , p2n}), we first define pa, the
reduced set of parameters as {p11, . . . , p1m}\p2n.
Then the atomic states in the merged frame of discernment are:
Θpa ∪ ((Θpa\{})×Θpr2)∪Θpr2
Note that we must differentiate between the empty sets found in both predicates when in the merged state, and will
thus refer to the former as {}1 and the latter as {}2.
The new frame of discernment contains n+m non-atomic states. As before, these non-atomic states encapsulate all
atomic states containing a parameter of the same name. The only exception to this is the state p1i , which encompasses
any atomic state with elements in p2j for j = 1 . . . n.
The belief mass assignments (BMAs) for all atomic states from pr1 remain the same. BMAs for atomic states
containing elements from pr2 are computed by multiplying the BMA from the relevant state in pr1 with the state
from pr2. Thus for example, the BMA for state a,f in Fig. 2 is 0.4 × 0.6 = 0.24. As can be seen from the figure,
compound state G was also assigned a BMA. This was because the frame of discernment in the original predicate had
an associated BMA. The BMA for the p1i compound state is computed as the BMA assigned to the original frame of
discernment multiplied by the BMA assigned to all its sub-states in pr1.
Converting BMAs to opinions, we see that an opinion about a proposition remains the same in both the merged
and unmerged models. This is an important result for the rest of our framework, as arguments are based on opinions
rather than BMAs. It should be noted that ω(geologist(fred)) = ω(holds(geologist(fred))), even though the belief
mass assignments remain the same. However, ω(a) remains the same in both cases.
Argument schemes, while mainly used in the higher levels of our framework, form the second part of our universe
of discourse. They are instantiated to form concrete arguments. We assume that our framework contains only a finite
number of argument schemes:
Definition 8 (Argument scheme). Given a universe of discourse U = (PF,AS), an argument scheme as ∈ AS is a
tuple
(Name,Premises,Conclusions,F,A)
Name uniquely identifies the argument scheme, Premises and Conclusions are tuples of the form (li , (s1, . . . , sn)) such
that ∃(li ,Parameters) ∈ PF where n = |Parameters|. si ∈ Φ are symbols. All tuples within Premises and Conclusions
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mapping opinions over all premises to opinions over all conclusions.
The admissibility function A is used to compute whether an argument (defined below) can be used given a specific
set of premises. If it can, the F function is used to assign a set of opinions to the conclusions of the argument based
on the opinions assigned to its premises. Both the A and F functions can make use of the following:
• The standard arithmetic operators (+,−, etc).
• Comparison operators (<,, etc).
• Boolean operators (not, or , etc).
• The functions b(ω), d(ω), u(ω) on an opinion ω.
• Subjective logic boolean (Definition 4), independent consensus and discounting (Definitions 5 and 6), and other
[7] operators, operating on opinions.
• References to predicates mentioned in Premises and Conclusions.
• An if/then conditional.
• An “unpacking” operator to refer to the parameters of a predicate.
As an example, Modus Ponens can be represented with the argument scheme (ModusPonens, {holds(A),
implies(A,B)}, {holds(B)},F, true). Here, F is:
ω(holds(B)) =
{ 〈0,0,1〉 b(holds(A)) < 0.5 or b(implies(A,B)) < 0.5
ω(holds(A)) b(holds(A) < b(implies(A,B))
ω(implies(A,B)) otherwise
The first condition is not strictly necessary, as the applicability function can be crafted to prevent it from ever being
evaluated. The second and third conditions choose an opinion based on the strength of the premises. Clearly, other F
functions are also possible.
We make use of first order unification to transform an argument scheme into a concrete argument. Symbols found
in the argument scheme’s premises and conclusions are replaced with symbols found in the predicate’s frame of
discernment. As in most forms of unification, identical symbols are transformed into identical variables. Arguments
are thus instantiated argument schemes.
Definition 9 (Instantiated argument). An instantiated argument for an argument scheme (Name,Premises,
Conclusions,F,A) is a tuple of the form A = (Name,M) where M is a set of symbol pairs (s, l) such that s ∈ Σ
and l ∈ Φ . Given that the argument scheme’s Premises and Conclusions are of the form (li , (s1, . . . , sn)), we have
the restriction that s ∈ {s1, . . . , sn}. Finally, given two pairs (s1, l1), (s2, l2) ∈ M , such that s1, s2 ∈ S and l1, l2 ∈ L,
l1 = l2 iff s1 = s2.
We name the set of all possible instantiated arguments Args.
Thus, for example, given the argument scheme for Modus Ponens defined above, and assuming a knowledge base
containing the predicates holds(a) and implies(a, b) associated with sufficiently high levels of belief, we may generate
the instantiated argument (ModusPonens, {(A,a), (B,b))}. Using instantiated arguments in this form is unwieldy
as references to premises and conclusions from the argument scheme must constantly be made. We can write an
instantiated argument in an abbreviated form. For example, given the previously described argument scheme for
Modus Ponens, and the previously described instantiated argument, we will write
(ModusPonens, {holds(a), implies(a, b)}, {holds(b)},A,F )
If the A and F functions are not used in the context in which we refer to the argument, we may leave them out.
Until now, we have described what individual arguments look like. However, arguments do not exist in isolation.
Instead, they interact with each other, reinforcing or weakening opinions about predicates in the process. Unlike
most other argumentation frameworks, we do not explicitly model rebutting and undercutting attacks to show how
arguments interact. Instead, we use the concept of accrual of arguments to allow for both argument strengthening and
weakening. To represent interactions between arguments, we must be able to answer the following question: what
happens when two different arguments have opinions about a (partially shared) set of predicates in their conclusions?
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ments for and against a certain conclusion, and given no extra information, we apply the consensus operator based on
the opinions garnered from the arguments to arrive at a final opinion for the conclusion. While the consensus operator
works well in most cases, it fails in a number of situations. Specifically, accruals do not always accrue in the manner
captured by this operator. We now explore some situations where this occurs.
Prakken [14] lays out three principles that the scheme of accrual of arguments adheres to. These are:
(1) Accruals are sometimes weaker than their elements.
(2) An accrual makes its elements inapplicable.
(3) Flawed reasons or arguments may not accrue.
The weakening of an accrual, according to Prakken, is due to the possibility that the accruing reasons are not
independent. As an example, he suggests the case where two reasons exist not to go running, namely that it is hot,
and that it is raining. However, for some runners, this specific combination of conditions may be less unpleasant than
either condition alone, or may even be a reason to go running. Prakken claims that the interactions between reasons
means that, in general, it is impossible to calculate the strength of an accrual from is accruing elements. We believe
that while this claim is true in specific cases, in the general case the consensus operator combines accrual elements
in an intuitively correct manner. Our framework is, however, designed to cater for special cases where the consensus
operator should not be used. In these cases, a custom function is used instead of the consensus operator to perform the
accrual.
While relatively obvious, the second principle is critical. Any framework supporting accrual of arguments must not
count evidence twice. However, if the accrual is defeated, its component parts should be reinstated.
The final point states that if a component within an accrual is defeated, it should not be counted when performing
the accrual; otherwise this might mean that the accrual as a whole becomes invalid.
While some researchers have suggested that accrual of arguments is an argument scheme and can be treated as such
(arguably, for example [13]), Prakken’s view, in our understanding, is that the best way to handle accrual of arguments
is by following a two stage process. First, determine what arguments may enter into an accrual, and second compute
the effects of the accrual. We agree that accrual of arguments cannot be treated as “just another” argument scheme due
to its role and nature. We believe, however, that in certain situations (usually obeying principle 1), accrual of evidence
can be treated as an argument scheme. The way in which our framework aligns these two views is one of its most
unique aspects.
We will provide an informal outline of how we approach accrual of arguments before giving a formal description
of the process. Informally, given multiple arguments for a conclusion, we apply the standard consensus rule. However,
if an argument is advanced which subsumes (some of the) arguments which take part in the consensus, the subsumed
argument’s conclusions are ignored, and the subsuming rule is used instead. If any of those arguments are attacked
and defeated, then our accrual rule is itself defeated, allowing all its undefeated (and previously subsumed) members
to act again. If some of the newly activated sub-members were, in turn, part of accruals, those accruals would enter
into force again.
We claim that an argument subsumes another if the subsumed argument’s premises are a subset of the subsuming
argument’s premises, and at least one conclusion is shared. However, any conclusions that are not shared are still in
force. Thus, for example, given the three arguments “if it is raining, we do not run”, “if it is hot, we do not run”, and
“if it is hot and raining, we do run”, it is clear that the third argument would subsume the other two. It is also clear
that if the first argument is changed to read “if it is raining, we do not run and do not hang washing out to dry”, we
would run, but still not hang washing out to dry. Formally,
Definition 10 (Argument subsumption). Given two instantiated arguments (written in abbreviated form), (Arg1, {p11,
. . . , pl1}, {c11, . . . , cm1}), and (Arg2, {p12, . . . , pn2}, {c12, . . . , co2}), we say that Arg2 subsumes Arg1 for a set of
conclusions C iff the following two conditions hold:
(1) for all pi1, i = 1 . . . l there is a j ∈ {1 . . . l} such that pi1 = pj2.
(2) for some 1 < i <m and 1 < j < o, ci1 = cj2 and ci1, cj2 ∈ C
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Arg2 maximally subsumes Arg1 for a set of conclusions C if Arg2 subsumes Arg1 for a set of conclusions C and
there is no set of conclusions D for which Arg2 subsumes Arg1 such that |D| > |C|.
When given multiple arguments for a conclusion, we apply only the argument that maximally subsumes all other
arguments for that conclusion. If any arguments remain that can be applied, they are combined using the Subjective
Logic independent consensus operator.
We are now in a position to provide an algorithm for evaluating how sets of (instantiated) arguments interact. Our
algorithm is shown in Fig. 3; it is inspired by the way reasoning is performed in probabilistic networks, and, in fact,
is best explained by thinking of our sets of arguments and predicates as a graph. Both predicates and arguments can
be thought of as nodes, with a directed edge between the two if the predicate appears in the premises or conclusions
of an argument. The edge enters the argument in the case of the predicate being a premise, and exits the argument
otherwise.
One weakness of our approach is the assumption that our argument graph is acyclic. This makes it difficult to
represent certain classes of arguments such as “a holds iff b holds”. Another family of cycles that can arise in the
graph involves self reinforcing, or self defeating chains of argument. However, due to the nature of our algorithm, this
class of argument does not pose as big a problem. Some possible solutions to this issue are discussed in Section 5.
To operate, our algorithm requires an argument graph, as well as a starting set of opinions. We assume that these
opinions are not under dispute, and the associated nodes must, therefore, have no edges leading into them. Our algo-
rithm then propagates these opinions forward through the graph, until all applicable arguments in the graph have been
taken into account. A few issues need to be taken into consideration to ensure the proper functioning of our algorithm:
• Only justified arguments should be used.
• Defaults must be taken into account.
• It must be possible to differentiate between visited and unvisited nodes.
• All, or only some of an argument’s conclusions may participate in an accrual.
Given: a set of instantiated arguments A
a set of possible facts and associated opinions PF,ωPF
Variables:
visitedFacts VF
visitedArguments VA
VF = PF
repeat until A = VA
∀a = (p, c,applicable,F ) ∈ A\VA
if ∀pi ∈ p,pi ∈ VF
if admissible(a)
VA = VA ∪A
else
A = A\a
∀r ∈ PF\VF
if a ∈ A\VA such that r ∈ c(a)
∀a ∈ VA such that r ∈ c(a) and a2 ∈ VA such that a2(c(a))  a(c(a))
ωPF(r) =
⊕
(F (a))
VF = VF ∪ r
else if a ∈ A such that r ∈ c(a)
ωPF(r) = 〈0,0,1〉
VF = VF ∪ r
Fig. 3. An algorithm to compute conclusions given a set of argument schemes, instantiated arguments, and optionally, some opinions. c(a) represents
the conclusions of instantiated argument a, F(a) the application of a’s F function, and a2(c(a)) and a(c(a)) represent the arguments whose
conclusions are c(a). Note that the abbreviated form of an instantiated argument is used in the algorithm.
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into account accrual of arguments). An argument node is evaluated if all predicate nodes leading into it are assigned
an opinion, unless the predicate node has no arguments leading into it (for example due to argument defeat) in which
case they are assigned a default opinion of 〈0,0,1〉. Our algorithm terminates in O(n) time, where n is the number of
edges.
If an argument is not admissible, it is removed from evaluation. It should be noted that once an argument is removed,
it cannot be reinstated. However, arguments are only removed when there is no chance that they will be admissible, so
the framework yields the same results as our intuition. As we will discuss in Section 5, there is only a weak relation
between our semantics and Dung’s argumentation semantics. We also defer discussion of other representational issues
relating to the underlying framework to Section 5.
At this point, we have a way of determining which conclusions hold given a set of arguments. Next, we describe
a procedure for how the set of arguments is generated. This is done in two parts. We assume that our argument
framework is used within the context of a dialogue. The utterances made in the course of the dialogue result in the
set of arguments. Thus, we begin by formalising the dialogue process, after which we provide a decision rule which
dialogue participants can use to determine which arguments they should advance at any point in the dialogue. Once
this is done, we can show how agents, arguments and argument schemes interact to form our complete framework.
To specify the dialogue, we need to further constrain and describe the environment in which it takes place. We
assume that dialogue occurs between two or more agents, each of which has a private knowledge base, opinions about
the environment, and individual goals. The dialogue environment contains a public commitment store into which the
agents’ arguments are inserted, as well as the set of valid argument schemes. Since we are interested in arguing about
evidence in partially observable domains, we make the assumption that the environment holds a set of sensors. These
sensors may be probed to obtain opinions about the value of various relations. In practise, sensors may be agents, static
parts of the environment, or, in fact, any entity capable of providing an opinion about the environment. We assume
that multiple sensors can give opinions about the same relations, and that some sensors are more reliable than others.
Definition 11 (Environment). Given a universe of discourse (PF,AS). The environment Env is a tuple (Agents,CS,
S,PC) where Agents is the set of agents operating in the environment, CS ⊆ PF is the commitment store (a public
knowledge base of arguments), and S is the set of sensors present in the environment. PC : 2S → R is the sensor
probing cost function.
Definition 12 (Agents). Given environment Env = (Agents,CS, S,PC), an agent α ∈ Agents is a tuple (Name,KB,
G,C) consisting of the agent’s name, Name, a private knowledge base KB ⊆ PF containing opinions about the en-
vironment, a goal function G :Θ → R mapping combinations of opinions on predicates (obtained by looking at the
frame of discernment) to utility values, and a variable C ∈ R to keep track of the agent’s utility cost.
Definition 13 (Sensors). A sensor s ∈ S is a structure (Ωs,Ωp). Ωs is a set containing predicate, opinion pairs
representing the reliability of a sensor with respect to the predicate. Ωp is another predicate, opinion pair which stores
the sensor’s opinion regarding the state of the predicate.
Agents take turns to advance a line of argument (consisting of one or more instantiated arguments), and probe
sensors to obtain more information about the environment. Such an action is called an utterance. In each turn, the
contents of an agent’s utterance is added to the commitment store; any sensors probed are marked as such (a sensor
may not be probed more than once for the value of a specific relation), and costs are updated. Once made, there is no
way to withdraw the contents of an utterance from the commitment store.
Definition 14 (Utterances). The utterance function
utterance : Environment × Name → 2Args × Probes
takes in an environment and an agent (via its name), and returns the utterance made by the agent. The first part of
the utterance lists the arguments advanced by the agent, while the second lists the probes the agents would like to
undertake where Probes ∈ 2S .
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turn : Environment × Name → Environment
takes in an environment and an agent label, and returns a new environment containing the effects of an agent’s utter-
ance.
In our framework, the turn function is defined as
turn = (NewAgents,CS ∪ Ar,NewSensors,PC)
where Ar,NewAgents and NewSensors are computed from the results of the utterance function. Assuming that the
agent making the utterance is agent α, if utterance(Env,Name) = (Ar,Probes) then
NewAgents = (Agents \ {α})∪ (Name,KB,G,C + PC(Probes))
and, ∀(s, l) ∈ Probes, where l is a predicate that sensor s is able to probe,
NewSensors = (Sensors \ {s})∪ (Ωs,Ωp ∪ωp(l)))
It should be noted that the utterance depends on agent strategy; one possible utterance function was described
in [11], and will be summarised later. Before doing so, we must define a protocol which agents may use to argue
with each other. This protocol, often referred to as a dialogue game [9], contains only one locution (in which agents
advance an argument and probe sensors), and allows agents to alternate in making utterances. More complicated
dialogue games are also possible, but are not examined here as they are auxiliary to the focus of this paper.
We may assume that agents are named Agent0,Agent1, . . . ,Agentn−1 where n is the number of agents participating
in the dialogue. We can define the dialogue game in terms of the turn function by setting
turn0 = turn((Agents,CS0, S,admissible,PC),Agent0)
and then having turni+1 = turn(turni ,Agenti mod n). The game ends if turni . . . turni−n+1 = turni−n.
When the dialogue starts, CS0 contains publicly known arguments. It is usually empty. It should be noted that an
agent may make a null utterance {,} during its turn to (eventually) bring the game to an end. In fact, given a finite
number of arguments and sensors, it should be clear that the dialogue is guaranteed to terminate, as, eventually, no
utterances will be possible that will modify the public knowledge base CS.
At any time, we may compute an agent’s utility by combining its utility gain (for achieving its goals) with its current
costs. At any stage of the dialogue, given the environment’s CS, and the set of all opinions probed by the sensors
{Ωp|s = (Ωs,Ωp) ∈ S}, as well as the set of legal argument schemes, we can run the reasoning algorithm to compute
the set of “proven” relations; that is, relations for which an opinion exceeds a predetermined admissibility bound.
Similarly, we can determine which relations have their negation proven, and which relations are simply unproven.
Given CS, the set of all opinions probed by the sensors {Ωp | s = (Ωs,Ωp) ∈ S} and an admissibility function
Admissible(ω) → [true, false,unknown], we can run the reasoning algorithm over all possible facts to create a set of
true, false and unproven predicates. If we name these sets ftrue, ffalse and funknown, then the agent’s net utility gain is
G(ftrue, ffalse, funknown) − C, where C is the agent’s utility cost. At the end of the dialogue, we assume that agents
agree that literals in the ftrue and ffalse sets hold in the environment.
One simple decision procedure for an agent (described in detail in [11]) involves it performing one step look-ahead
to decide which utterance to make. The agent computes what probes it can make by looking at what sensors have not
yet been probed, and what arguments it can advance (by looking at its knowledge base, the commitment store, and the
set of argument schemes). It then calculates the utility gain for each combination of probes and advanced arguments,
advancing the ones that maximise its utility.
4. Example
In this section, we describe a dialogue in a hypothetical bridge building scenario. Two agents, α and β must use
these argument schemes to have a discussion about the amount of concrete and steel needed to build a bridge. Agent
α’s goal involves attempting to minimise the amount of steel needed—α is responsible for the supply of steel. This
may be achieved by showing that the environment is in such a state where little steel, and lots of concrete is needed.
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interests of clarity, our description is semi-formal.
Assume we have the following general argument schemes (here, ArgExpertOp is the scheme for an argument from
expert opinion [20]):
Name Premises Conclusions A F
ModusPonens {A, implies(A,B)} {B} A1 F1
ArgExpertOp {expert(E,D), claims(E,A), inDomain(A,D)} {A} A2 F2
D1 {sand(L), support(X,L)} {concrete(X)} A3 F3
D2 {rock(L), support(X,L)} {steel(X)} A4 F4
D3 {mud(L), support(X,L)} {concrete(X)} A5 F5
D4 {rock(L), sand(L), {steel(X), A6 F6
support(X,L)} concrete(X)}
where
A1: true if b(A) and b(implies(A,B)) are both  0.5 else false
F1: ω(B) =
{ 〈0,0,1〉 if b(holds(A)) < 0.5 or b(implies(A,B)) < 0.5
ω(holds(A)) if b(holds(A)) < b(implies(A,B))
ω(implies(A,B)) otherwise
A2: true if d(expert(E,D)) < 0.5 & d(inDomain(A,D)) < 0.5
F2: ω(A) = claims(E,A)
For D1 . . .D4, the admissibility function requires that the belief in rock, sand or mud be greater than 0.5, and the F
function sets the conclusions to the same strength as the premises, except for D4. Here, steel(X) is set to the average
value of rock(L) and sand(L), while concrete(X) is set to ¬steel(X).
The top level frame of discernment is created using the predicates
sand, rock,mud, implies, expert, claims, inDomain, fastWater
The sand, rock,mud and fastWater frames of discernment contain l (representing a location). The implies frame
of discernment contains the tuple (fastWater,mud), while expert contains geologist, inDomain contains the tuple
(geology, sand), and, finally, claims contains
(geologist, sand), (geologist,mud), (geologist, rock)
Let α have an opinion of 〈0.9,0,0.1〉 regarding sand(l) stored in it’s knowledge base. Assume that it also believes
fastWater(l) and claims(geologist, sand(l)).
Finally, let the environment contain sensors s1, s2, s3, s4, with the first two being able to monitor the status of
sand(l), s3 able to observe all states in the claims frames of discernment, and s4 being able to detect fastWater(l). Let
s1 also be able to discern the status of rock(l). We associate opinions 〈0.7,0.2,0.1〉, 〈0.8,0.2,0.1〉, 〈0.9,0,0.1〉 and
〈0.8,0.1,0.1〉 regarding the sensors’ respective reliabilities.
Agent α begins the conversation by making the utterance
((D1, {sand(l), support(bridge, l)}, {concrete(bridge)}), {(s1, sand(l))})
That is, it probes whether sand exists in the location the bridge is to be built, and instantiates an argument based on D1
claiming that since it is sandy, a large amount of concrete is required for the bridge.2 Assume that s1 returns a value
of 〈0.7,0,0.3〉. This means that sand(l) is now associated with an opinion of 〈0.56,0.07,0.37〉 in the CS.
Agent β responds by probing another sensor
(, {(s2, sand(l))})
2 The probe may return values, contrary to the agent’s belief, that cause the argument to be inapplicable.
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is now 〈0.45,0.36,0.09〉. Agent α’s argument is now no longer admissible.
No more sensors exist that can be used to determine whether sand(l) holds or not. Agent α thus advances the
argument
((ArgExpertOp, {expert(geologist,geology),
claims(geologist, sand(l)), indomain(geology, sand(l))}, {sand(l)}),
{(s3, claims(geologist, sand(l)))})
The probe here represents asking the witness for their testimony. Assume that the witness returns an opinion of
〈0.8,0.1,0.1〉. Now, sand(l) would again be a justified conclusion. At this point, it should be noted that the admis-
sibility requirements for the argument from expert opinion mean that the burden of proof is assigned to the agent
challenging the argument. More complex behaviour, such as requiring the agent introducing the argument to justify
their assumptions, is easily introduced by changing the form of A and F .
Agent β now turns to an argument using accruals. It points out that
((D4, {rock(l), sand(l), support(bridge, l)}, {concrete(bridge), steel(bridge)}),
{(s1, rock(l))})
In other words, the presence of rock together with sand means that steel rather than concrete is required. Since this
argument scheme’s F function is not dogmatic, the conclusion for concrete is weakened, but not eliminated.
Finally, α responds with the argument
({(ModusPonens, {fastWater(l), implies(fastwater(l),mud(l))},
{mud(l)}), (D3, {mud(l), support(bridge, l)},
{concrete(bridge)})}, {(s4, fastWater(l))})
That is, by showing that there is fast water at location l, it supports the conclusion that mud exists at l. The
existence of mud means that argument scheme D3 can be used, which accrues (via the default consensus operator)
with the current opinion regarding the need for concrete.
At this point in the conversation, the agents have no further arguments to advance, and the dialogue terminates.
Predicates concrete(l) and steel(l) have opinions associated with them. Depending on the form of the admissibility
function, they, or their negation, may be judged as proven or unproven. If, for example, concrete(l) is judged to be
admissible, both agents would agree that more concrete should be used at the site.
The first three utterances of the dialogue are shown in Fig. 4. It is assumed that any unprobed predicates were in the
commitment store at the start of the dialogue, together with their associated opinions. As can be seen, after the second
utterance, the low opinion associated with sand(l) means that the argument advanced at the start of the dialogue is no
longer deemed applicable. Thus, the opinion associated with concrete(bridge) would revert to its default value. The
argument graph for the entire dialogue is shown in Fig. 5.
5. Discussion
In this section, we examine some of the novel features of our framework in detail, as well as looking at related
research and possible future work.
Our framework was designed to allow for complex argument to take place, particularly in the domain of evidential
reasoning. Uncertainty is a key feature of such domains, hence our decision to base our framework on Subjective
Logic. Catering for uncertainty in argumentation frameworks is by no means new. Pollock [13] made probability a
central feature of his OSCAR architecture. We disagree with his extensive use of the “weakest link” principle, however,
believing that, while it may often hold, it is not always applicable (as mentioned in [14]). His use of probability, rather
than uncertainty is another point at which our approaches diverge. Other notable work includes that of Vreeswijk
[18], and Haenni [5]. The latter suggests an approach called “Probabilistic argumentation systems”. These systems
are designed to perform inference under uncertainty within conflicting knowledge bases. While lacking a dialogical
aspect, he shows a relation between his work and Dempster–Schafer theory.
N. Oren et al. / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 838–854 851Fig. 4. The argument graph obtained after the first three utterances are made. The numbers show during which turn a sensor probe was made. Solid
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Fig. 5. The complete argument graph for the dialogue. The numbers show during which turn a sensor probe was made. Solid arrows indicate support
for an argument or predicate, while dashed lines represent an attack.
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richness. Not only are we able to represent probability (via belief), but we are also able to speak about ignorance (via
uncertainty). Differentiating between these two concepts lets us represent defaults in a natural, and elegant way. A de-
fault can be represented by specifying, within the A function, that a conclusion may hold as long as the disbelief for
a premise remains below a certain threshold. By requiring that belief remain above some threshold, normal premises
can also be represented. A simple example of this was provided in the previous section, where everyone, by default,
is assumed to be an expert. Burden of proof [19] is very closely related to defaults, and we model it in the same way.
Argument schemes have been extensively discussed in the literature (see for example [3,20]). A small, but growing
number of argumentation frameworks provide explicit support for argument schemes (e.g. [17]). We believe that
supporting argument schemes in our framework not only enhances argument understanding, but that such support also
provides clear practical advantages, including the separation of domain and argument knowledge, re-usability, and a
possible reduction in computational complexity when deciding what arguments to advance. The separation between
arguments and agent knowledge created by argument schemes raises the intriguing possibility of the modification and
dynamic creation of argument schemes during a dialogue.
We have separated out the F and A functions within our representation of argument schemes as we believe that
in some situations, the decision regarding whether an argument scheme is applicable, and how strongly it supports its
conclusions, are independent of each other. Separating out the two functions is also practically useful; by explicitly
excluding an argument based on the result of its A function, we can avoid extra calculations in our algorithm. Agents
can also use the A function in the heuristic to avoid considering the application of invalid argument schemes.
Jøsang has proposed a large number of additional operators for use in Subjective Logic which have not been
mentioned in this paper (see for example [8]). Many of these operators appear to encapsulate common forms of
reasoning about evidence, and can thus (with appropriate restrictions on premises and conclusions) form the basis of
an argument scheme’s F function. We believe that using our framework as a basis for investigating additional possible
Subjective Logic operators may be fruitful.
Another area in which we plan to extend the framework involves unification and quantification. At the moment,
we perform universal quantification over all the elements of a frame of discernment. That is, if the expert frame of
discernment contains (geologist,mud), we could deduce
expert(geologist(fred),mud(l)), expert(geologist(mary),mud(m))
with no way of specifying that in fact, fred is only an expert in mud at location l, not location m.
The interplay between sensors and arguments is an area in which little formal work has been done [12]. While
our model is very simple, it elegantly captures the fact that sensor data is inherently unreliable in many situations.
Enriching our model of sensors is one area in which we plan to do future work.
Our model was designed with support for accrual of arguments in mind. The way in which we deal with accrual
of arguments, while powerful, is still limited, and overcoming these limitations is a priority. We are unable to handle
accruals in which the accrued and accruing arguments share no conclusions. While it is often possible to add an explicit
negated conclusion so as to negate the accrued argument’s conclusions, this is incorrect in some situations. Instead,
we recommend extending the framework by introducing an explicit accrual relationship between argument schemes.
Representing such situations requires inputting additional domain knowledge into the framework, the domain-specific
nature of such accruals means that no other way to handle them exists.
We are currently investigating what effects a mapping between our model and a Dung-like abstract model [4] will
have. By allowing for linked arguments [10] and support between arguments [1], the translation of the graph that
results from an application of the model to one embedded in an abstract model allows us to cater for some types of
loops. However, this approach does not allow us to deal with argument strength in a satisfactory manner, meaning that
techniques for representing self-reinforcing arguments must still be investigated.
The dialogue game we have proposed is very simple, and only guarantees dialogue termination (given a finite num-
ber of argumentation schemes, finite knowledge bases, and a finite number of sensors). Dispute focus, that is, ensuring
that agents advance arguments relevant to the conversation, is provided by the utility based argument heuristic. Also
related to the dialogue game, as well as the structure of the agents and environment, is the problem of advancing an
argument without proof. Depending on the structure of an argument scheme’s F function, a sensor must always be
probed before an argument may be advanced. Thus, the initial burden of proof always falls on the agent making an ut-
terance. While some may claim that such an approach makes sense (after all, even commonsense knowledge requires
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There are a number of ways to avoid this issue. The most obvious is to set up initial predicates in the commitment
store with the appropriate belief values. Another way would involve the addition of a single zero utility cost sensor
that an agent may probe to set a predicate’s initial value. It is also possible to craft the F function to allow for certain
claims with no proof. None of these approaches are fully satisfying, as they allow for only one side of a claim to be
made without the need for proof. Allowing agents to act as sensors might be a better way of overcoming this problem,
and the addition of explicit “claim” and “challenge” moves in the dialogue is another way to attack this issue. The
decision procedure we have described is based on some of our earlier work [11]. Other researchers have advanced
other possible approaches to argument selection [2], and it would be interesting to integrate these techniques into our
work.
6. Conclusions
Argumentation is a well recognised, powerful reasoning technique. With a few notable exceptions, however, argu-
ment frameworks have had difficulty operating in domains where uncertainty is present. Furthermore, most argument
frameworks have examined only a single aspect such as the underlying logical representation, the interaction between
arguments, or a dialogue model.
In this paper, we have presented a novel framework for argumentation in uncertain domains. In this framework,
argument schemes are key concepts, allowing for a rich set of primitives to be utilised. We have also demonstrated
how the accrual of arguments, defaults, and burden of proof may be naturally captured. While the lowest levels of the
model are sufficiently general to be applied to almost any area in which argument can be employed, the higher levels
are aimed at the support of evidence-based reasoning. To this end, we introduced the concept of sensors, abstracting
the notion of obtaining information from the environment. Finally, we introduced a dialogue game and a decision
procedure allowing agents to decide which arguments to advance.
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